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I. INTRODUCTION
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is a powerful
lobbying force. As the recording industry's premiere trade organization,
the RIAA represents the "creators, manufacturers, and distributors of over
ninety percent of all legitimate sound recordings."' As such, the RIAA
exercises considerable influence over music copyright policy and
legislation, though this influence is tempered by the sometimes contrary
goals of the electronics industry.2 The RIAA seeks to restrictively define
music copyrights, hoping to limit new digital recording technologies that
ostensibly encourage piracy. Conversely, the electronics industry seeks to
maximize profits by continually introducing new and improved digital
technologies that might be perceived as facilitating piracy. 3  On a
superficial level, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA)
4
resolved these competing interests by imposing a levy scheme on each
digital recorder sold in exchange for a "home recording exemption"
which legitimizes limited consumer copying.5 However, technology has
outstripped traditional copyright law, 6 and the industries were at
1. Recording Indus. Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29
F. Supp.2d 624, 625 (C.D.Cal. 1998) [hereinafter R/AA 1] The RIAA serves as the
lobbying arm for the recorded music industry, which is dominated by five major
labels: BMG Entertainment, Warner Music Group, Universal Music Group, EMI
Recorded Music, and Sony Music. See Heather D. Rafter et. al., Streaming Into the
Future: Music and Video on the Internet, in 19TH ANNUAL INST. ON COMPUTER LAw 605,
611 (Practicing Law Institute 1999). These industry giants, which control
approximately eighty percent of the "popular" music industry, dominate and
constrain the political goals of the industry.
2. See generally Lewis Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 497, 499-500 (1998).
3. This debate already has played out between the electronics industry and
the entertainment industry in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 455-56 (1984) (holding that VCRs have legitimate uses, such as creation
of home videos, despite their possible role in facilitating piracy).
4. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4237 [hereinafter AHRA] (codifed as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)). The AHRA sought to create a working, mutually profitable
compromise between the electronics and recording industries.
5. Seel7 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1008.
6. SeeJennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How Far Does
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?,
7 COMMLAW CONSPECrUS 423, 426 (1999).
[Vol. 26:41136
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loggerheads again in 1998 with the advent of portable MP3 technology in
the form of Diamond Multimedia's Rio player. MP3 is a form of
compression technology (which will be discussed at length later) that
allows computer music files to be rendered significantly smaller. MP3 files
typically are available for downloading from the Internet and Diamond's
portable Rio player (much like a Sony Walkman) enables the user to
transport these files easily.
The RLAA's recent Ninth Circuit lawsuit against Diamond
Multimedia, an electronics company, sought to block Diamond from
selling the first portable MP3 player. Both the district
7 and appellate
8
courts returned verdicts for Diamond, which surprised industry watchers
expecting an easy RIAA victory. 9 Part II of this article examines the AHRA
and clarifies the controlling standard in the law of digital music
reproduction. Part III explains MP3 technology and its potential threat to
the traditional recorded music industry. Part IV details the district and
appellate court decisions, focusing on the differences in the decisions.
Part V discusses the ramifications of the appellate court's assertions and
explores the legal future of digital music technology. Part VI concludes
that the appellate court decision flings open the door for technological
expansion and new digital recording futures.
II. THE AUDIO HOME RECORDING ACT OF 1992
The RIAA sued Diamond under several provisions of the AHRA.
Both the trial and appellate courts undertook an extensive examination of
the AHRA in deciding the case.' ° The courts came to vastly differing
conclusions, however, regarding the intent and scope of the Act."
Technology has proven to be a continuous challenge for legislators
attempting to preserve the basic premise of the Copyright Act. Prior to
the recent amendments to the Copyright Act... case law clumsily
attempted to apply old standards to new problems. Courts have
struggled to discover a nexus between copyright theories that were
intended to endure modern technology and situations that exist online.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. See RIAA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d 624, 633 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
8. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter RIAA I/].
9. The force of the RIAA as a shaper of music technology policy will be
discussed in the section on the AHRA. See infra Part II.
10. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1075; RIAA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d at 628. Both decisions
delved into the legislative history of the Act.
11. See infra Part IV. The trial court found that the Rio fell within a narrow
exception to the Act based on the Rio's inability to digitally output sound files and
1137
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The AHRA largely was a Congressional response to the introduction
of Digital Audio Tape (DAT) technology in the mid-1980s." Whereas
previous home taping involved analog transfer with poorer sound quality
in the copy, DAT permitted perfect digital copies, regardless of the
number of copies made.' Though Americans showed only lukewarm
enthusiasm towards the DAT technology, a worried recording industry
worked to block rampant digital audio recording.
1 4
Matters reached a boiling point in 1990 when pop songwriter
Sammie Cahn and four music publishers instigated a class-action lawsuit
against Sony (a DAT manufacturer) in an attempt to block all digital
recording technology from being imported, manufactured or sold in the
United States. 5 When this case settled in 1991,16 it included an agreement
between the recording and electronics industries wherein the electronics
industry promised to support efforts to create legislation that would
resolve the home taping problem." The AHRA largely codified the
settlement agreement.1
A. The Debate Over Home Copying and Fair Use
Digital recording created new concerns for the recorded music
industry, but the status of unauthorized home taping-even analog
reproduction-long had been undefined, largely because sound
recordings were not eligible for copyright until the relatively late date of
thereby produce serial digital copies. See RIAA I, 29 F. Supp.2d at 632. However,
the appellate court broadly construed the Act, finding a loophole that excluded
any music file first recorded to a hard drive. This holding legitimized MP3 players,
which receive music files from a computer hard drive. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d at
1078.
12. See The Audio Home Recording Act: Hearings on S. 1623 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 102nd Cong.
19 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1623] (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
13. See id. at 90 (statement of Edward P. Murphy, President, National Music
Publishers' Association, Inc. on behalf of the © Copyright Coalition). "Unlike the
copies created by analog recording devices found in most American homes today,
digital copies are perfect clones of the original-even after many generations of
copies have been made. Thus, a copy of a copy sounds as pristine as the original
source material." Id.
14. See id. at 19 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and
Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
15. See Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 2, at 500.
16. See id. at 500 (citing Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.YJuly
11, 1991)).
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1971.' 9 A fierce debate immediately ensued as to whether home recording
constituted fair use under the copyright act. 20
The electronics industry contended that the legislative history of the
Sound Recording Act of 1971 displayed support for home audio taping.22
However, that language was not incorporated into the final act. The
recording industry relied upon this omission to assert that home copying
was not fair use.' 3
This matter remained unresolved until passage of the AHRA. In the
legislative history of the AHRA, the Register of Copyrights concluded that
the Copyright Office had reviewed both commentary and legislative
history and determined that there was no fair use exception under the
Copyright Act as it stood prior to the AHRA.24
The recording industry contended that it would suffer great
economic loss due to piracy if home taping constituted fair use. Industry-
sponsored studies asserted a yearly loss of as much as $2.85 billion due to
home taping of prerecorded music. 2 5 Researchers question these studies,
19. See Hearings on S. 1623, supra note 12, at 11 (statement of Ralph Oman,
Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
20. See Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 2, at 499-500.
In the period between 1971 and the passage of the Audio Home
Recording Act, the legal status of home recording was ambiguous. That
is to say, it was not clear whether or not the practice constituted an
infringement of copyright. During this period a lengthy lobbying
struggle occurred between the recording industry, which sought
congressional intervention in the form of a levy scheme, and the
electronics manufacturers, who opposed such schemes and championed
the cause of home recording.
Id.
21. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1994)).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566. The
electronics industry relied upon this statement: "Specifically, it is not the intention
of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from broadcast or from tapes or
records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it."
Id. at 1572.
23. See Hearings on S. 1623, supra note 12, at 12 (statement of Ralph Oman,
Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services) (noting
that the Sound Recording Act does not recognize home taping as fair use).
24. See id. at 13-14. This conclusion definitively declares home taping to be a
copyright-infringing activity, neatly setting up the need for the compromises
demanded by the AHRA.
25. See Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 2, at 502. Note that this figure is
from a 1980 Warner Communications study and thus is pre-digital. If these analog
figures are realistic estimates, the losses resulting from online piracy would be
1139
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noting that the figures posit an unlikely one-to-one ratio whereby each
home copy represents a lost sale. 6 In any event, even allowing for
recording industry hyperbole, the amount of home recording is
substantial.
Increasing tension between the recording and electronics industry
interests led to the need for a compromise. Both industries represented
well-established lobby interests with significant economic concerns. The
AHRA sought to resolve these competing interests by providing both a
technological solution and a royalty-based solution, examined in detail
below.
B. The Relevant AHRA Definitions
The AHRA sought to define and limit what types of devices could be
covered under the Act. The Act, under its definition of "digital audio
recording device," encompasses:
any machine or device of a type commonly distributed to
substantially higher today.
26. See id. at 505-07. Kurlantzick & Pennino analyze the error that each home
copy represents a lost sale:
[T]his [one-to-one] ratio is in error. The error is apparent if we look
closely at what is occurring economically when a consumer chooses to
purchase a "pirate" tape or when a home recorder opts to tape a
recording. Imagine that a pre-recorded tape from a record company
sells at retail for $10 and that a duplicator's version of that same tape is
priced at $5. Our hypothetical consumer elects to buy the latter product
at $5. Does it follow that he would have purchased the record company's
offering at $10 if the pirate version were not available? Of course not. A
person's willingness to buy a product at $X does not demonstrate that he
would be willing to purchase that product at $X + Y. The only conclusion
we can confidently draw from the consumer's behavior is that he was
willing to pay $X for the recording, as there is no reason to believe that
demand for this product is completely inelastic .... A similar analysis
applies to home recording. Imagine a home recorder who borrows a
pre-recorded tape ... [and] makes a copy of the recording on his
duplicating equipment .... [L]et us assume that the cost is $3. That
cost is less than the retail price of the pre-recorded tape. In choosing to
home record the person opts for a cost of $3. Again, his behavior does
not establish a willingness to purchase the original producer's tape at
$10. In other words, not all music taped off air or from borrowed discs
or tapes represents lost sales since individuals who are willing to tape
music would not necessarily be willing to pay the full price to buy the
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individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with
or as part of some other machine or device, the recording
function of which is designed or marketed for the primary
purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied
recording for private use, except for-(A) professional model
products.
27
The AHRA also provides a specific exemption for home taping, thus
ending the "fair use" debate over sound recordings.28 The Act makes no
distinction between digital or analog home copying, allowing both. This
concession to home copying required a concurrent agreement on the part
of the electronics industry to create a tariff on each digital audio
recording device and each digital audio recording medium (i.e.,
recordable compact discs, minidiscs, digital audio tapes, etc., sold) .29
Thus, the electronics industry was given free reign to import and
manufacture all digital recording devices that permit home copying, such
as DAT machines and compact disc recorders. The imposed tariffs go
into a sound recording fund that distributes the proceeds to various music
copyright holders. °
27. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (3) (1994). The exception for professional equipment is
designed to allow those components "intended for use by recording professionals
in the ordinary course of a lawful business." Id. at § 1001 (10). Interestingly, this
exception leaves untaxed precisely those pieces of equipment that can most easily
be used for large-scale piracy, such as CD recorders with multiple-disc record
capabilities. The Act also provides no restrictions on who may purchase this
"professional" equipment, and it is routinely and widely available, albeit more
expensive than its noncommercial counterparts.
28. Id. § 1008. "No action may be brought.., based on the noncommercial
use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical
recording or analog musical recordings." Id. By basing the home copying
exemption on the consumer's lack of commercial gain, the Act does not explicitly
outlaw the type of behavior so feared by Internet naysayers-the posting of MP3
and regular audio files for free downloading. No commercial gain is realized
where music collections are posted to the Web for downloading. It took an
entirely different piece of legislation to outlaw non-profitable copyright
infringement. This legislation-the No Electronic Theft Act-is discussed briefly
infra at Part V.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a) (1994) (providing that the tariff on "each digital
audio recording device ... shall be 2 percent of the transfer price"). Another
subsection of the statute sets the royalty payment for each piece of blank digital
audio recording media at three percent of the transfer price. See id. § 1004(b).
30. Seeld. § 1006(a). This section states:
The royalty payments... shall.., be distributed to any interested
copyright party
(1) whose musical work or sound recording has been-
7
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The recording industry was concerned that home digital copying had
the potential to develop into rampant commercial piracy. One of the
primary concerns with DAT technology-and, indeed, with all digital
recording technologies-was that unlimited digital copying created the
potential for unlimited serial copying 1 and piracy. Serial copying, rather
than the ability to make one copy, was the AHRA's primary concern. To
combat serial copying, electronics manufacturers had to agree to a
technological solution, the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS).
32
This technological solution makes serial copying impossible on
equipment sold for home use. Devices equipped with SCMS can make a
digital copy of a digital original, but the digital copy cannot be
reproduced. However, a home user still is free to copy the digital original
as many times as desired.
The AHRA also defined a "digital musical recording" and, pertinent
for purposes here, noted that it does not include:
[A] material object-
in which the fixed sounds consist entirely of spoken word
recordings, or
embodied in a digital musical recording or an analog musical recording
lawfully made under this title that has been distributed [to the public],
and
distributed in the form of digital musical recordings or analog musical
recordings or disseminated to the public in transmissions, during the
period to which such payments pertain....
Id.
31. Serial copying refers to the act of making a copy from a copy. Digital
copies show none of the degradation in sound quality that afflicts analog
recordings. Thus, one could make a theoretically infinite series of perfect copies.
See Hearings on S. 1623, supra note 12, at 109 (statement of Jason S. Berman,
President, Recording Industry Association of America, Washington D.C.). Mr.
Berman stated:
Digital audiotape and other digital audio recording formats, such as
DCC, minidisc, and recordable CD, now make possible digital-as
opposed to analog-copying. The result is a perfect clone with the same
brilliant sound quality as the original, and unique to digital copying,
every subsequent copy of that copy, whether the first or the 1,000th
generation, will be as perfect as the prerecorded original.
Id.
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (prohibiting the importation, manufacture or
distribution of any digital audio recording device or interface lacking a Serial
Copy Management System or its functional equivalent).
1142 [Vol. 26:4
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in which one or more computer programs are fixed, except that
a digital musical recording may contain statements or
instructions constituting the fixed sounds and incidental
material, and statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in order to bring about the perception, reproduction,
or communication of the fixed sounds and incidental
material.33
The AHRA sought a compromise between competing lucrative
industries. Understandably, the explosion of digital musical transmission
was not foreseen in 1992 when the bill was passed. However, while the
recording industry steadfastly refused to acknowledge and accommodate
new digital music technology, the electronics industry hurtled forward,
setting the stage for 1998's RJAA-Diamondjuggernaut.
III. MP3 TECHNOLOGY
Transmission of digital music over computer networks always has
been theoretically possible. Compact discs encode music in a digital
format (called a "wave file") that can be stored on a hard drive and
uploaded to the Internet. Until recently, however, transmission of these
files proved difficult, as each minute of music required ten megabytes,
making the average pop song a forty- to fifty-megabyte file.34 Moreover,
until the last two years, home consumer Internet access speed was
relatively slow, generally only 33.6 kilobytes per second (kbps)." A 33.6
kpbs modem would take about three to four hours to download a single
song. Lately, however, cable and digital subscriber line (DSL) modem
technologies have provided home consumers with high-speed access to
the Internet, allowing for dramatically increased download speeds.
33. Id. § 1001(5)(B). In RIAA I, examined in depth in Part IV, Diamond
Multimedia relied heavily upon this language, asserting that "section 5(B)(ii) is
unambiguous on its face and that 'material objects... in which one or more
computer programs are fixed' encompasses not only computer programs on CD-
ROM, but also hard drives .... " RIAA , 29 F. Supp.2d 624, 629 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
Indeed, Diamond used section 5(B) (ii) to argue that Congress explicitly intended
to "'exclude the personal computer industry' from regulation under the AHRA."
Id.
34. See Howard Siegel, Digital Distribution of Music: How Current Trends Affect
Industry, MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST, Oct. 1998. "The current .mp3 file format is four
to five times more efficient than the former .wav files." Id.
35. See id. "In days of yore (about three to five years ago), those who sought
CD-quality audio from an Internet site had to endure hefty download periods due
to large file sizes and sluggish data throughput." Id.
36. DSL technology uses existing copper telephone loops, but greatly
expands their capacity, allowing faster transmission of music and video files. See
1143
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Additionally, mass storage prices have dropped drastically, making not
only transmission, but also storage of a multitude of MP3 files a reality for
even the casual home computer user.37
MP3 technology (Motion Picture Experts Group 1 layer 3) provides a
dramatic reduction in the size of voice or music computer files without
loss of sound quality."' The file reduction results from removal of
inaudible, redundant data.3' By shrinking the file size to three or four
megabytes (a mere one-twelfth of its original size), MP3 allows for rapid
transmission of music files.4°
More importantly, MP3 technology is almost universally available.
The Internet offers free software applications for playing and creating
MP3 files.4' Even Microsoft, typically an anti-piracy stalwart, included MP3
capabilities in its recent Windows Media Player.42 Previous use of MP3
HENK BRANDS & EVAN T. LEO, THE LAW & REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIERS 548-49 (1999).
37. See Siegel, supra note 34. The author notes that "higher-capacity mass
storage devices (e.g., improved hard drives), faster modems and the ever-
increasing presence of multimedia-capable home computers" have transformed
the Internet into "an operational music broadcast and reproduction network." Id.
38. See Rafter et. al., supra note 1, at 615.
39. See Ted Greenwald, Decoding the Codecs, WIRED, Aug. 1999, at 142.
A codec [of which MP3 is one] is a formula that removes data-
redundant data, data you aren't likely to notice, data that can be derived
from other data, and so on-so files can be transmitted more quickly....
A codec's effectiveness is measured by three criteria: the processing
power needed to decode it, the data rate required to play back encoded
data, and how close to the original the final result looks or sounds. For
instance, MP3 audio... can be decoded by an average desktop machine.
An MP3 file plays back at roughly 128 Kbps (that is, you can't play it back
in real time over a modem; you must download it first, which takes about
4 minutes per minute of music). And it sounds very close to the
original.
Id.
40. See Neil J. Rosini & Howard M. Singer, Music and the Internet, in
REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COMPANY 1999 865, 870 (Practicing Law Institute
1999). "Using only a 28.8 modem, a consumer can download a typical [MP3-
encoded] song to a hard drive in under 20 minutes." Id. With the widespread
advent of 56K modems, this estimate can be halved. Greenwald postulates that the
MP3 file size and transmission rate is almost ideal: "Tuned to deliver highest
efficiency at 128 Kbps [kilobytes per second], MP3 is too dense to stream [transmit
in 'real time'] over dialup connections but just light enough to encourage
downloading entire songs." Greenwald, supra note 39, at 143.
41. Rafter et. al., supra note 1, at 614-15.
42. See Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent
Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution,
7 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REv. 57, 63 (1999).
1144 [Vol. 26:4
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technology was limited to hackers and technophiles, but the widespread
availability and simplicity of MP3 encoders and players now threatens the
traditional recorded music industry. Additionally, MP3 technology is non-
proprietary and anyone can use it. A music consumer easily can post an
entire music collection to the Web in MP3 format, permitting
theoretically innumerable consumers to download the files. This practice
has proven problematic at college campuses, where high-speed
connections and storage space are ample.44 Unsurprisingly, the first




The widespread potential for piracy has worried the recorded music
industry. When Diamond proposed the first portable MP3 player 41 in
43. See id. at 60-61 (noting that "the inventors of MP3 created a file format
without copyright protection or a royalty streaming mechanism").
44. See Rafter et. al., supra note 1, at 616.
45. See Andy Patrizio, DOJ Cracks Down on MP3 Pirate, WIRED NEWS (Aug. 23,
1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/mpthree/story/21391.html>
(on file with author).
The convicted.., student may face jail time for illegally distributing
copyrighted material. Jeffrey Gerard Levy ... faces three years in prison
and a $250,000 fine, but is likely to get probation and a fine ....
The NET [No Electronic Theft] Act passed in 1997, closing a loophole in
piracy laws. Previously, it was illegal only to sell copyrighted software and
other electronic media. If the content was not exchanged for money,
individuals could escape prosecution ....
In a two hour period, Levy's site sent out 1.7 GB of data.... With MP3
files averaging four to five megabytes in size, that translates to around 500
files.
Id.
46. See Markiewicz, supra note 6, at 439. In fact, the RIAA has directed 80% of
its anti-piracy funds to combat online piracy since 1997. See id. at 442.
47. See Ted J. Barthel, RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.: The Sale of
the Rio Player Forces the Music Industry to Dance to a New Beat, 9 DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART &
ENT. L. 279, 286 (1999).
The Rio Player is a battery-operated, compact, portable music player that
plays music files downloaded from the Internet or from CDs. It is
designed to store and play audio files transferred from a computer's hard
drive. What is new about this type of computer peripheral device is that a
user can detach the Rio Player from the computer and play back the
audio files separately through headphones while away from the
computer. The player is about the size of a deck of cards and roughly the
same weight. It has no moving parts which makes it especially well suited
to use during vigorous activity.
1145
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1998, the recording industry faced the threat of MP3 fans who now could
take files anywhere:
4
So far, regular use of MP3 has been limited to the kind of
people likely to have the patience to do much of their music
listening through a pair of computer speakers-principally
hard-core hardware freaks and college students with high
bandwidth Net connections. But now, with the sexy, Walkman-
esque Rio... that could change. Plug the Rio into your
computer, copy a load of MP3 files into its memory and go. It's
a no-brainer for consumers and a nightmare for record
49executives.
The above is not traditional recorded music industry hyperbole. The
mobility, availability and ease of MP3 files is unprecedented in digital
technology.50 Indeed, observers estimate that as many as 200,000 illegal
MP3 sites exist on the web." Lycos, a prominent Internet search engine,
further legitimized the trend toward widely available MP3 files when it
added an MP3 search, which scans the Web by artist or song to find both
legal and pirated MP3 files, making no guarantees as to the legality of
those files. The RIAA has threatened separate legal action over this turn
of events.5
Id. (citations omitted).
48. See Rafter et. al., supra note 1, at 616.
49. Id.
50. Not only are MP3 files small, and therefore technologically manageable;
they also have spawned a vast number of easy-to-use applications with which the
most technophobic consumer still can feel comfortable. See Henriquez, supra note
42, at 63.
51. See Barak D. Jolish, Scuttling the Music Pirate: Protecting Recordings in the Age
of the Internet, ENT. & SPORTS LAw., Spring 1999, at 9, 10. Independent and
industry figures differ. A cnet.com-sponsored study sets the number of illegal
recordings at 80,000, on 2,000 sites. The RIAA's estimate places the number of
sites at 200,000. See id.
52. Lycos' links to MP3 files are considerable: "[Lycos'] Fast MP3 Search...
reportedly posted over a half million links to MP3 song files on February 1, 1999.
The computer equipment powering the search engine had to be upgraded within
48 hours because the demand was four to five times higher than anticipated."
Markiewicz, supra note 6, at 440 (citations omitted).
53. See RIAA May Sue Lycos over MP3, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 25, 1999)
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/business/story/18723.html> (on file with
author). In March 1999, the RIAA stated that it was considering a lawsuit against
Lycos, echoing a recent European filing whereby the International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry sued Lycos' Norwegian partner. See id. This lawsuit, if
filed in the United States, most likely would be predicated on Internet service
provider liability for online content, not piracy per se. See Markiewicz, supra note
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MP3's ease and availability, combined with Diamond's proposal for
newfound portability, made a recording industry lawsuit inevitable. The
industry scrambled to use now-ancient (in technology terms) definitions
found in the AHRA to restrict what it perceived as almost uncontrollable
piracy potential.
IV. THE RLAA CASES
A. RIAA I-The District Court Decision
The RLAA's lawsuit against Diamond Multimedia, the Rio's
manufacturer, involved not only a giant industry clash, it also provided the
first opportunity for a court to examine the AHRA. 4 Industry watchers
from both the recording and electronics camps waited to see how the
district court would decide the case.5 At stake was not merely Diamond's
right to manufacture and sell its first MP3 player. If the court affirmed
Diamond's rights, numerous other portable MP3 player manufacturers
would be free to offer their wares. Also, an electronics industry-friendly
interpretation of the AHRA could make more digital recording
technology available in the United States.
In October 1998, the RLAA sought a preliminary injunction against
Diamond Multimedia. The RIAA alleged that the sale and manufacture
of the Rio violated the AHRA because it was a digital audio recording
device. 57  Under the Act, all digital audio recording devices must
incorporate a Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) in order to
prevent unlimited serial copying. 8 Diamond Multimedia asserted first
6, at 442.
54. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d 1072, 1077 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The Act has only
been discussed once in a published opinion by another federal court, and there,
only to explain why it had no effect on the Copyright Act provisions at issue in that
case.").
55. See Don Biederman, Copyright Trends: With Friends Like These .., 17 ENT.
AND SPORTS L., Fall 1999, at 3.
56. See RIAA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d 624, 625 (C.D.Cal. 1998). The RIAA initially
filed a complaint and ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an
order to show cause regarding the preliminary injunction. See id. at 625-26. The
district court heard oral arguments and initially issued a temporary restraining
order restricting Diamond from manufacture or distribution of its Rio player. See
id. at 626. The RIAA posted a bond to ensure the temporary restraining order,
and Diamond then filed its opposition to the preliminary injunction. See id.
57. See id. at 625. The term "digital audio recording device" is defined in the
AHRA. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (3) (1994).
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002; RIAA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d at 631. Note that that the
RIAA's purpose in this lawsuit is twofold. It seeks not only to allege that the lack of
SCMS renders the Rio unfit for sale, but rather to also assert that the Act controls
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that the Rio did not qualify as a digital audio recording device because the
source of the MP3 files copied to the Rio was a computer hard drive,
which could not be considered a "digital musical recording." 9 In the
alternative, Diamond argued that the Rio was not a digital audio
recording device because it had no digital recording function. The Rio
lacks any output capability and thus is incapable of passing along further
generations of digital copies.61
1. The Preliminary Injunction Standard Debate
The prickly relations between the recorded music and consumer
electronics industries immediately led to a dispute as to the standard for
granting the preliminary injunction.2 Under the traditional injunction
standard, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff will experience
irreparable injury without the injunction; (2) the plaintiff most likely will
win the case on the merits; (3) harms favor the plaintiff; and (4) public
interest favors the plaintiff.63 The district court noted that an "alternative
standard" for injunctive relief also exists, whereby the plaintiff must show
either "(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted; or (2) the existence
of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips
sharply in its favor."'
The RIAA proposed a departure from the traditional theories of
injunctive relief, arguing that the "traditional proof of irreparable harm is
not required... [w]here a federal statute grants authority to enjoin
violations."65 The RLAA relied specifically upon a provision in the AHRA
which notes that the court can grant temporary or permanent injunctions
as necessary to prevent violations of the Act.66 The recording industry
should not have to await extensive economic losses to enjoin a device
designed for piracy. However, at the district court level, the RIAA's
the device.
59. See RIAA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d at 628. The court notes that, for the Rio to be
making "digital audio copied recordings" under the Act, it must be making a
.reproduction in a digital recording format of a digital musical recording." Id.
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1994)).
60. See id.
61. See id. at 632.
62. See id. at 626.
63. See id. (referring to International Jensen v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d
819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993)).
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860,
869 (9th Cir. 1983)).
66. See id. (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 1009(c)(1) (1994)).
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arguments under this proposed standard were a bit muddled. First, the
RIAA asserted that the rights under the AHRA were "inextricably related"
to the rights of the traditional copyright act,67 thus entitling the RIAA to
the presumption of irreparable harms consistent with all copyright
actions.! However, the court noted that copyright actions by definition
are incompatible with the AHRA, and the RIAA cannot simultaneously
contend that the Rio is subject to both the AHRA and the copyright act.69
The court acknowledged that copyright claims are entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm in certain circumstances, but concluded
that such circumstances did not exist in the instant case.70 The court then
noted that the mere existence of a federal statute "does not per se
preclude consideration of traditional equitable factors, including
irreparable harm."71 The district court concluded that the type of harm
alleged by the RIAA did not meet the "incalculable and incurable" injury
standard and that injunctive relief was inappropriate under the federal
statute standard .
67. See id. at 627.
68. See id.
69. See id. The court stated, "In the instant action, however, Plaintiffs are not
asserting a copyright claim. If, as Plaintiffs contend, the Rio is subject to the
AHRA, then copyright infringement is impossible as a matter of law." Id. The
AHRA specifically bans copyright infringement actions:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of
copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a
digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an
analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on
the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for
making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
70. See RJAA I, 29 F. Supp.2d at 627. The cases cited by the RLAA referred to
issues of "reputation, quality of goods, or consumer confusion," none of which
were asserted in the RIAA's suit. Id. No consumer confusion can arise from an
MP3 version of a commercial CD audio track, as one is a mere digital file, and the
other is physically located on a commercial CD. The "consumer confusion"
standard seems more applicable to CD pirates who seek to provide physically
identical packaging to promote their illicit product.
71. Id. at 626.
72. See id. at 627. The court adds:
Moreover, although a copyright action might "normally" entail
"incalculable and incurable" injuries, the instant action does not. The
only potentially "incalculable" injury asserted by Plaintiffs is the Rio's
contribution to the traffic in illegal MP3 files .... [A]lthough this type
of injury is undeniably "incalculable," it is not a compensable injury
under the Act and fails to justify an extension of the irreparable harm
1149
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2. The District Court's Review of the AHRA
The district court determined that it needed to examine the AHRA,
beginning with the plain language of the statute itself. The court would
delve into history only if necessary. No precedent existed in case law, as
this was the first case that required substantial interpretation of the
AHRA. 3 Due to diverging views of the Rio's status as a digital audio
recording device under the AHRA, the court carefully examined the
relevant definitions, specifically whether the computer hard drive
necessary to receive MP3 files qualified as a "digital musical recording"74 or
a "digital audio recording device."
75
Under the AHRA, a digital audio recording device must be able to
make a "digital audio copied recording" from a "digital musical
recording."76 Diamond asserted that, since a computer hard drive is the
source of MP3 files, the hard drive did not qualify as a digital musical
recording and thus was not subject to the AHRA. Diamond pointed to
an exception in the AHRA where a digital musical recording could not
include any material object "in which one or more computer programs
are fixed,"78 such as the hard drive of a computer. The Rio player cannot
receive MP3 files until they are downloaded to a computer hard drive.
Diamond asserted that this was a "hard drive exception," but the RIAA
contended that the intent of this section of the AHRA was narrowly drawn
to except only CD-ROMs (such as games or multimedia presentations, as
distinct from audio CDs) with "incidental audio tracks."
79
The RIAA admitted that hard drives by definition were not subject to
the AHRA. 0 The RIAA asserted, however, that this exclusion resulted
from the very definition of a digital audio recording device, which
excluded any device whose "primary purpose" was not recording digital
audio."' The RIAA argued that Diamond's Rio player's primary purpose
was to record digital audio, subjecting it to the AHRA. The question of
presumption applicable in Copyright actions.
Id.
73. See id.
74. See supra note 33.
75. See supra note 27.
76. See RIAA I, 29 F.Supp.2d at 628.
77. See id.
78. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (5) (B) (ii) (1994)).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 628-29.
82. See id. at 629.
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whether a hard drive exemption results from section 1001(5) (B) (ii)
("digital musical recording") of the AHRA or from section 1001(3)
("digital audio recording device") became moot in the appellate court
opinion, which determined that the hard drive exemption stems from
both parts of the Act.83
3. The District Court Examination of AHRA Legislative History
Much of the district court's discussion of AHRA's legislative history
centered upon how computers and hard drives should be construed
under the Act8 4 but the court's analysis provided almost no clear guidance.
Diamond asserted that hard drives were exempt from the AHRA, relying
upon the testimony of James Burger, head of a computer industry trade
association, who asserted that the computer industry went along with the
AHRA precisely because it would not cover "a computer nor any of its
peripherals... "85 The court dismissed Burger's contribution, noting that
83. See RIAA I1, 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
84. See id.
85. See id. (quoting Burger Decl. paras. 10-11). The court's treatment in full is
as follows:
Defendant relies heavily on the declaration of James Burger, an attorney
and former Chairman of the Intellectual Property Committee of the
Information Industry Council ("ITI"), a trade association representing
the interests of the computer industry. In his capacity as Chairman of
ITI, Burger purports to have "engaged in direct discussions with
representatives of the [Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association
'CEMA'] and RIAA officials regarding the AHRA, as well as Legislators
and their staff." On the issue of whether Section (5) (B) (ii) encompasses
hard drives, Burger provided the following narrative:
"I was asked if [ITI] would not oppose the bill if computers were
specifically excluded from the legislation. My response was that if the bill
contained language that made it clear that neither a computer nor any of
its peripherals were covered we would not oppose the legislation.
The result of our discussions was the specific language now contained in
Section 1001(5) (B) (ii). Under that subsection once a music file was
fixed on a computer's hard drive as semipermanent memory of any kind,
it was no longer a digital musical recording covered by the Act.
Accordingly, we advised CEMA members and the RIAA that we would not
oppose the AHRA. The legislative history is clear on this point:
'Similarly, neither a personal computer whose recording function is
designed and marketed primarily for the recording of data and computer
programs, nor a machine whose recording function is designed and
marketed for the primary purpose of copying multimedia products,
would qualify as a digital audio recording device.'"
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Burger's declaration concerned digital audio devices, not digital musical
86recordings. The court preferred to rely upon the equally partisan
statement of Cary Sherman, an RIAA representative."
The district court showed a general inclination to accept the RIAA's
interpretations over that of Diamond, noting that Diamond's construction
would "effectively eviscerate the AHRA." 8 Specifically, the district court
supported the RIAA's interpretations of "digital music recording." 9 The
Although Burger unequivocally opines that Section (5) (B) (ii) includes
hard drives, his reference to the legislative history is not persuasive. The
sentence Burger quotes from the Senate report to support Defendant's
interpretation of Section (5) (B) (ii) actually appears in the context of a
discussion of Section 1001 (3), the definition of "DAR device."
Id. (citations omitted).
86. See RJAA , 29 F. Supp.2d at 629. Contrast this with the clear reading
given by the appellate court:
The Senate Report states that "if the material object contains computer
programs or data bases that are not incidental to the fixed sounds, then
the material object would not qualify" under the basic definition of a
digital musical recording. The Senate Report further states that the
definition "is intended to cover those objects commonly understood to
embody sound recordings and their underlying works." A footnote
makes explicit that this definition only extends to the material objects in
which songs are normally fixed: "[t]hat is recorded compact discs, digital
audio tapes, audio cassettes, long-playing albums, digital compact
cassettes, and mini-discs."
RIAA H, 180 F.3d at 1077 (citations omitted).
87. See RJAA , 29 F. Supp.2d at 630 n.3. Though the court found that
Sherman was a "far from a disinterested witness," it used his statement to disregard
Burger's testimony. See id. The court never addressed why the electronics and
computer industries would have agreed to the compromises in the AHRA (a tariff
scheme, restrictions on multigenerational copies-both of which are an expense
to the industries) if something so widespread and vital as hard drives were
encompassed under the tariff scheme.
88. See id. at 630. Diamond's interpretation of the AHRA-that a music file's
residence on a hard drive automatically creates an exemption whereby the file no
longer is a digital musical recording-would allow any device that required a
download to a hard drive to avoid AHRA regulation. See id.
89. See id. The House Judiciary Committee Report, for example, states that:
A definition of "digital musical recording" has been added, with revisions
reflecting exemptions for talking books and computer programs.... As
with "talking books," the bill specifically excludes computer programs
(which generally are classified under the Copyright Act as literary works).
In addition to containing an express exclusion of computer programs in
the definition of "digital musical recording," the Committee expressly
includes the technical embodiment of statements of instructions
incidental to the playback or reproduction of music by referencing such
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district court found that the Rio probably was a digital audio recording
device, and thus should fall under the AHRA. 90
The court also rejected Diamond's argument that technological
change simply had outstripped the AHRA, rendering it meaningless. 9'
The district court proceeded in the same fashion to examine
portions of the legislative history and strongly rejected Diamond's
• • 92
interpretations. The court noted that Diamond's arguments held
"superficial appeal" but were antithetical to the purpose of the AHRA.2'
4. Serial Copying and the District Court's Decision
Though the court rejected Diamond's arguments regarding the
inapplicability of the AHRA definitions to the present case, it held for
Diamond on the serial copying issue.
94
To pass muster under the AHRA, devices must be equipped with an
SCMS device to restrict creation of multigenerational digital copies.9'
These copies constitute the greatest problem with digital recording
statements or instructions in both sections 1001 (5) (A) (i) and (B) (ii).
Id. (citing House Judiciary Committee, 102nd Cong. (Sept. 17, 1992) (emphasis
omitted)). From this, the court infers a "legislative intent to avoid immunizing the
illegitimate copying of computer programs from liability for copyright
infringement." Id.
90. See id. at 632.
91. See id. at 630. The court's attitude contrasts sharply with that of legal
experts in the field. Vito Peraino, a technology lawyer at Hancock Rothert &
Bunshoft in Los Angeles, California, recently wrote in Wired:
MP3 is colliding head-on with antiquated copyright laws-laws that the
record execs are clinging to in an attempt to control a future market
where music will exist only in bytes.
The loudest voice in Big Music, the Recording Industry Association of
America, has spent the last few years ignoring the fact that old laws and
outmoded business models will never stop technology, when the industry
should have been fast-tracking online delivery formats that cater to the
consumer while offering artists a reasonable guarantee that their work
won't get ripped off.
Vito Peraino, The Law of Increasing Returns, WIRED, Aug. 1999, at 144.
92. See RIAA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d at 630-631. Diamond's additional argument that
the Rio player depends on personal computer software and has no independent
recording function was rejected as inconsistent with the purposes of the AHRA.
93. See id. at 629.
94. See id. at 631.
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994). "Multigenerational" refers to digital
copies made from digital copies.
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devices.96 The Rio does not employ an SCMS device, largely because it
lacks digital output capability and therefore is inherently incapable of
creating digital copies. The district court concluded that it was
"nonsensical" to demand incorporation of SCMS technology, as it would
fail to prevent the Rio's ability to copy pirated MP3 files from the
Internet.
97
The court held that the RIAA had established no presumption of
success on the merits regarding the SCMS issue." Additionally, the district
court determined that the Rio could have substantial noninfringing uses
(the copying of legitimate MP3 files; the conversion of personally-owned
CD tracks to MP3 format) and concluded that an injunction would
"deprive the public of a device with significant beneficial uses."9
The district court's decision was muddled and strangely narrow. The
court assumed that an interpretation of the legislative history was needed,
even though it could have been based its decision on the language of the
AHRA alone.1 °° The court thus missed an opportunity to provide clear
guidance on the scope of the Act. Moreover, the court seriously limited
its own understanding of what was at stake by refusing to carefully
examine the technology in the case. The appellate court was left with the
task of carefully analyzing the new technology and providing a clear
resolution of the AHRA's scope.
B. RIAA I1-The Appellate Court Decision
After failing at the district court level, the RIAA appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'0 ' The appellate court issued a sweeping,
pro-technology decision that found a large loophole in the AHRA for any
device (such as the Rio) that first passes files through a computer hard
drive.
96. Because a digital copy of a digital copy is a perfect replica (unlike analog
copies, which degrade with each successive copy) a potential for unlimited piracy
arises. See Hearings on S. 1623, supra note 12, at 115 (statement ofJason S. Berman,
President, Recording Industry Association of America, Washington D.C.).
97. See R!AA I, 29 F. Supp.2d at 632.
98. See id. Having requested injunctive relief, the RIA.A needed to prove a
presumption of success on the merits. The court concluded that the RAA had
not established that it would be able to prove that the Rio should be required to
possess an SCMS device. See id.
99. Id. at 633.
100. The appellate court specifically criticized the lower court's procedure in
this regard. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We need not resort
to the legislative history because the statutory language is clear.").
101. See id. at 1072.
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1. The Court's Technology and Piracy Overview
The appellate court began with a cogent analysis of the technology in
the case. The court noted that the widely available, non-proprietary
nature of the MP3 algorithm, combined with its considerable compression
powers, significantly increases the availability of Internet music. ' °
In evaluating the Rio, the court minimized the RIAA's piracy
concerns. It refused to take for granted the RJAA's complaints of a $300
million annual loss from current piracy and a fear of increasing digital
Internet piracy.10 3 Though the Internet offers pirated MP3 files, it also
contains a considerable number of lawful MP3 files. The appellate court
noted this large traffic in legitimate MP3 files, both free and available for
sale, and stated that these represent considerable legitimate future profit
104potential for both labels and independent recording artists. The court
also delineated the limited digital reproduction potential of the Rio
player. The device cannot receive files without Rio-specific software, it
stores only one hour of music, it offers only analog output via headphones
102. See id. at 1074. The court stated:
MP3's popularity is due in large part to the fact that it is a standard, non-
proprietary compression algorithm freely available for use by anyone,
unlike various proprietary (and copyright-secure) competitor algorithms.
Coupled with the use of cable modems, compression algorithms like MP3
may soon allow an hour of music to be downloaded from the Internet to
a personal computer in just a few minutes.
Id. This thoughtful explanation of the technology rivals those found in popular
technology journals. The appellate court's technological discussion contrasts
sharply with that in RIAA I, where the district court offered only a brief overview of
the Rio as a handheld device and discussed MP3's compression possibilities
without clearly delineating the revolutionary implications of the technology. See
R/AA 1, 29 F. Supp.2d at 625. RIAA Ipaints the initial lawsuit as a mere technical
legal dispute that did not require serious consideration of recorded music
technology. See id.
103. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1074. The court noted that the RIAA routinely
brings lawsuits and shuts down pirate websites. See id. Other sources state that
"few, if any" pirate sites are located in the United States and MP3 files are difficult
to locate and download. See id. The appellate court specifically noted the
Kurlantzick & Pennino critique of the "lost-sale" theory (see supra note 26) stating
that "a willingness to download illicit files for free does not necessarily correlate to
lost sales, for the simple reason that persons willing to accept an item for free
often will not purchase the same item, even if no longer freely available." Id. at
1074 n.1.
104. See id. at 1074. The court relied upon a 1998 Jupiter Communications
report (cited by Diamond) that predicts online sales for pre-recorded music in
excess of $1.4 billion by 2002. See id.
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and it cannot upload files to a computer. ° In short, the appellate court
did not take at face value the RIAA's claims that Rio would foster rampant
digital piracy.
2. The Appellate Court and the AHRA
The appellate court also examined the AHRA. It found that the
district court erred by examining the legislative history of the Act when
the statutory language was clear.'06 The appellate court still extensively
examined the legislative history, which both parties briefed thoroughly.' °7
The court seized the opportunity to scrutinize the intent of the Act, which
had never been studied at the appellate level.' 8
Rejecting the district court's conclusion, the appellate court
concluded that the AHRA did indeed contain a "hard-drive exemption.' 0 9
The court rested this finding on several pieces of the AHRA, bolstering its
conclusions with legislative history of the Act."0 First, the court stated that
AHRA's plain language excludes material objects "in which one or more
computer programs are fixed" from the definition of a digital musical
recording."' The court reasoned that a hard drive undeniably is a
material object which contains many fixed programs and therefore falls
outside the definition of a digital musical recording." 2  Because the
district court rejected this argument,"3 the appellate court bolstered its
conclusion with evidence from the Senate and House Reports of the
debate on the AHRA." '  Here, it found a footnote delineating those
105. See id. at 1075.
106. See id. at 1076.
107. See id. at 1077. Perhaps the court's willingness to pay attention to the
legislative history stemmed from its awareness that it was breaking new ground.
108. See id. at 1077 n.4.
109. See id. at 1078. "Under the plain meaning of the Act's definition of digital
audio recording devices, computers (and their hard drives) are not digital audio
recording devices because their 'primary purpose' is not to make digital audio
copied recordings." Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (3) (1994).
110. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1078. The Senate Report of the debate
surrounding the Act noted that a personal computer's recording function is not
primarily for audio recording, and the mere capability to record did not render it
a digital audio recording device. See id.
111. See id. at 1076 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B) (1994)).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1078. "The district court concluded that the exemption of hard
drives from the definition of digital music recording, and the exemption of
computers generally from the Act's ambit, 'would effectively eviscerate the
[Act].. . .'" Id. (quoting R[AA I, 29 F. Supp.2d 625, 630 (C.D.Cal. 1998)).
114. See id. at 1078:
The legislative history thus expressly recognizes that computers (and
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material objects in which songs can be fixed: compact discs, cassettes,
albums and the like."' The Act thus contains an intended exemption
whereby a hard drive cannot be considered a digital musical recording. 
11 6
Since the only possible source of MP3 files for the Rio is a computer's
hard drive, the Rio does not fall under the AHRA regulations.
The appellate court also found RIAA's other arguments wanting.
The court found that computer hard drives were not limited primarily to
making digital audio recordings, thus they could not be "digital audio
recording devices" under the Act." ' The court found substantial support
for this conclusion in the legislative history. It located a senate report"8
that stated that a personal computer could not fall under the definition of
"digital audio recording device" since a personal computer's ability to
record primarily is for recording computer programs.1 9 The appellate
court found that the legislative history very forward-thinking, noting that
legislators knowingly exempted personal computers from the Act despite
their digital recording capabilities.
2
)
This distinction has important ramifications for personal computers.
If computers are not digital audio recording devices, they are not taxable
under the Act, need not be equipped with SCMS and need not send or
receive copyright information where music tracks are concerned.
other devices) have recording functions capable of recording digital
musical recordings, and thus implicate the home taping and piracy
concerns to which the Act is responsive. Nonetheless, the legislative
history is consistent with the Act's plain language-computers are not
digital audio recording devices.
Id.
115. See id. at 1077.
116. See id. at 1078. The appellate court relies upon an affidavit from
Diamond, stating that the "exclusion of computers from the Act's scope was part
of a carefully negotiated compromise between the various industries with interests
at stake, and without which, the computer industry would have vigorously opposed
passage of the Act." Id. at 1078 n.6.
117. See id. at 1078.
118. See S. REP 102-294 (1992), reprinted in 1992 WL 133198, at *118-19.
119. RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1078. The court recapitulated an additional portion
of the same Senate Report, which noted, "If the 'primary purpose' of the
recording function is to make objects other than digital audio copied recordings,
then the machine or device is not a 'digital audio recording device,' even if the
machine or device is technically capable of making such recordings." Id. (citing S. REP 102-
294, supra note 118).
120. See id..
121. See id. The court agreed with the district court that, were a computer or
the Rio to be equipped with SCMS, it would make no difference in piracy
prevention, as most MP3 files do not carry copyright information. See id. at 1078-
79. The appellate court explained how an SCMS-equipped Rio player might
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Where the district court discussed this issue narrowly in light of the Rio
player itself, the appellate court framed the issue as determining the status
of computers themselves and examining a powerful tool for digital
recording of audio files.
12
3. The Rio and Personal Use
The appellate court further asserted that the Rio conformed to the
main purpose of the Act: facilitation of personal use.12' The Act
specifically outlawed any action against consumers for personal use,124 and
the Rio clearly existed for personal use. The court likened the Rio to a
VCR,' 25 stating that the Rio "merely makes copies in order to render
portable, or 'space-shift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard
drive." 26 Framing the Rio as a device for personal use allowed the court
clearly to assert the legitimacy of the device.
actually foster more piracy:
As the Technical Reference Document that describes the SCMS system
explains, "[d] igital audio signals... that have no information concerning
copyright and/or generation status shall be recorded by the [digital audio
recording] device so that the digital copy is copyright asserted and
original generation status." Thus, the incorporation of SCMS into the
Rio would allow the Rio to copy MP3 files lacking SCMS codes so long as
it marked the copied files as "original generation status." And such a
marking would allow another SCMS device to make unlimited further
copies of such "original generation status" files .... despite the fact that
the Rio does not permit such further copies to be made because it simply
cannot download or transmit the files that it stores to any other device.
Thus, the Rio without SCMS inherently allows less copying than SCMS
permits.
Id. at 1079 (quoting the Technical Reference Document for the AHRA).
122. See id. at 1078 n.6 (stating that the fragile compromise between industries
was crucial for the passage of the Act).
123. See id. at 1079.
124. See Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 2, at 497.
125. See RIAA II, 180 F.3d at 1079. Though the court's holding is appealing in
terms of the future of digital musical recording and transmission, its comparison
of VCRs and Rios seems a bit disingenuous. Where VCRs create analog recordings
from broadcasts that are often free, the Rio digitally reproduces files that are often
pirated versions of copyrighted material.
126. Id. The court relied upon Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which held that merely "time-shifting"
television shows for future viewing was fair use under the Copyright Act. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 455.
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4. The Loophole in the AHRA
The appellate court not only refused to grant an injunction to the
RIAA (the narrow relief requested), but confirmed the existence of a vast
loophole in the AHRA.'27 If a recording device such as the Rio first passes
its files through a computer hard drive, this transmission renders it
legal."8 This loophole provides a clear pathway for MP3 devices, which
are being released in great numbers.2 9 The appellate ruling also throws
down a gauntlet before Congress, demanding either that the Act's
loophole be closed or that the vagaries of new digital technology be
recognized and accommodated. As of the writing of this article, Congress
has not modified the Act in any way.
V. IMPACT OF THE RIAA DECISIONS
A. The Slow Pace of Congressional Change
The R/AA decisions leave a loophole in U.S. copyright policy
regarding Internet music and digital piracy. Technology has moved much
faster than federal lawmakers, who now must play catch-up, hoping they
can rewrite old laws to regulate as-yet-uninvented technology.
Congress recently closed a loophole where a copyright infringer was
required to turn a profit from his or her ill-gotten works to be liable. In
United States v. LaMacchia,130 an MIT student set up an Internet account
where users were encouraged to upload and download copyrighted
computer programs.1 3' The student did not charge for the "service" and
hence made no profit.1 32  Because traditional copyright infringement
127. See RJAA II, 180 F.3d at 1078 (noting Diamond's argument that the Act
does not cover any recording device that first passes the music through a
computer and holding that the Act "seems to have been expressly designed to
create this loophole").
128. See id. at 1078-79.
129. SeeJesse Freund, The MP3 Players, WIRED, Aug. 1999, at 136-37. Slated for
release this year, among others, are two more versions of Diamond Multimedia's
Rio player, both with greater storage capacity. Several other companies, including
Creative Lab's Nomad player (which is substantially similar to the Rio in shape and
storage), several models from Saehan and models from Samsung, will be released
in 1999-2000. The devices range in price from $199 to $999, making copying of
MP3 files reasonably affordable. See id.
130. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
131. Seeid. at 536.
132. See id. at 536-37. Although LaMacchia made no profit, "[t]he indictment
alleges that LaMacchia's scheme caused losses of more than one million dollars to
software copyright holders. The indictment does not allege that LaMacchia
sought or derived any personal benefit from the scheme to defraud." Id.
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requires profit, and copyright piracy could not automatically be equated
with theft,1 3 the court was forced to dismiss the case. 13 4 However, the
court asserted that there was nothing "edifying" about the student's
conduct and exhorted Congress to modify copyright laws to criminalize
such behavior.1 35  Notably, the court still expressed fears that copyright
infringement would be criminalized to the point where individuals
copying software for personal use could be prosecuted. 36 This loophole
requiring profit remained open until the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act
passed in December 1997.1,7 Congress took almost three years to close this
costly loophole, even with instruction from the court and compelling
evidence of piracy.'
38
The NET act, however, does not represent a total solution. The NET
133. See id. at 538. The limitations of copyright law regarding cyberspace even
a mere five years ago are evident in the government's prosecution of LaMacchia.
The wire fraud statute was the only tool the government had at its disposal to
criminalize the digital transmission of computer programs. See id. at 536.
134. See id. at 545.
135. See id. The court remarked:
This is not, of course, to suggest that there is anything edifying about
what LaMacchia is alleged to have done. If the indictment is to be
believed, one might at best describe his actions as heedlessly
irresponsible, and at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any
fundamental sense of values. Criminal as well as civil penalties should
probably attach to willful, multiple infringements of copyrighted software
even absent a commercial motive on the part of the infringer. One can
envision ways that the copyright law could be modified to permit such
prosecution.
Id.
136. See id The court could not have been aware of the coming furor over
music files, but made its decision independently.
137. See No Electronic Theft Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(1997). As one commentator explains:
The No Electronic Theft Act gives the government the ability to
prosecute those who have stolen copyrighted works and then given them
away over the Internet, rather than sold them for financial gain. The
new law applies to individuals who reproduce or distribute, by electronic
or other means, 10 or more copies of a copyrighted work during any 180
day period.
John F. Delaney et al., The Law of the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Internet Caselaw and
Legal Developments, in REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COMPANY, supra note 40, at 61,
106.
138. However, an actual conviction under the initiative took far longer. The
conviction of an Oregon student, mentioned earlier in this article, did not occur
until August 1999. See Patrizio, supra note 45.
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act requires the retail value of the electronically infringed material to
exceed $2,500.9 This requirement presents a problem. The casual MP3
user who occasionally posts a song to a website will never fall under the
new Act's ambit," ° but still can cause economic loss. In short, though the
new NET Act makes substantial strides towards dealing with new
technology, it does little to address the concerns raised in the RIAA cases.
B. Secure Digital Music Initiative
As an alternative to the difficulties of legislation, the electronic and
recording industries so opposed during the RIAA cases have joined
together to create a digital music protection scheme that will work across
all platforms."' Besides Diamond and the RIAA, the SDMI consortium
includes the International Federation of Phonographic Institutes (IFPI),
other technology companies and various record labels.1 42 The SDMI seeks
to provide consumers with continued access to music and to allow limited
home copying while allowing the recording industry to restrict
multigenerational digital copies."'
SDMI intends to create a universal technological specification that
139. See 18 U.S.C. 2319(b) (1) (1994); see also Delaney et. al., supra note 137, at
106.
140. As such, a user would fail to meet the $2,500 economic loss limit. One or
two songs shared on the Internet and downloaded a few times will simply not meet
this amount.
141. See Discord Surrounding Diamond Multimedia's Rio Player is Ended Through
Settlement Agreement, 1 No. 12 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 4 (1999) "The SDMI is a set
of guidelines that describes the basic technical features of a system that will limit
copying of music distributed on the World Wide Web, and will, the industry hopes,
become universal." Id.
The announcement surrounding the shared SDMI endeavor positively
glowed with cooperative spirit:
Ron Moore, Diamond Multimedia's general counsel, stated that his
company and its Rio Port subsidiary were happy to end the legal dispute
and "move forward with the music industry on the development of secure
e-commerce music offerings through the Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SDMI) .... "The RIAA is also pleased to bring a formal end to this legal
process," said Sherman, adding that the "announcement makes clear that
the future of the digital music marketplace will be created in the
marketplace itself, enabled by initiatives like SDMI."
Id.
142. See Henriquez, supra note 42, at 87.
143. The AHRA attempted to provide home consumers with the right to make
copies-digital or analog-for personal use. The SDMI attempts to restrict the
possibility of multigenerational copies while allowing the home user to engage in
home copying. See id. at 88-89.
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accommodates the consumer's desire for readily available digital
reproduction technology, while providing copyright support to copyright
owners.'"" If it succeeds, SDMI will work where the AHRA essentially
failed. It remains unclear, however, whether digital protection is best
accomplished by a hardware solution, a software solution or both. 45
SDMI's solution must be more forward-thinking than the fragile
compromises of the AHRA and must anticipate and accommodate yet
unimagined technologies.
C. Future Digital Protection Difficulties
Digital technology, by its very nature, is insecure. The storage of data
in binary digital form eventually can be copied. Quite recently, the
supposedly secure digital versatile disk (DVD) format146 (used primarily for
videos) was cracked. 147 As recordable DVD players now exist, breaking
copy protection on various commercially available DVD movies could
create a substantial piracy concern. Thus, the motion picture industry
seems poised to repeat the recorded music industry's problems.'48 A
144. See id. at 88.
145. See id. at 89. "By March 31, 1999, one year before the anticipated launch
of the universal specification, eighteen companies had presented proposals...
including content providers, consumer electronics manufacturers, security
technology vendors, and information technology companies." Id.
146. DVD is rapidly gaining popularity and may be poised to eventually replace
videocassettes.
DVDs are five-inch wide discs that, in this application, hold full-length
motion pictures. They are the latest technology for private home viewing
of recorded motion pictures. This technology drastically improves the
clarity and overall quality of a motion picture shown on a television or
computer screen.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp.2d 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
147. See Chris Oakes, DVD Hackers Hit With Lawsuit, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 28,
1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,33303,00.html> (on file
with author). A group of programmers "hacked" (that is, cracked the copyright
protection) on DVD, ostensibly out of disappointment over the lack of DVD
playback software for the Linux platform. See id. The hack allows a knowledgeable
user easily to copy entire DVD movies-anywhere from 4.7 to 9.4 gigabytes in size.
See id.
148. The fears of multigenerational DVD copies are strikingly similar to fears
of multigenerational music recording copies:
DVDs contain motion pictures in digital form, which presents an
enhanced risk of unauthorized reproduction and distribution because
digital copies made from DVDs do not degrade from generation to
generation. Concerned about this risk, motion picture companies,
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California Superior Court judge initially denied the DVD Copy Control
Association's request for a temporary injunction restraining the hackers
from posting the cracked code on the Internet.149 However, the U.S.
District Court in the Southern District of New York recently granted the
motion picture industry's similar injunction request. 150  Continued
vigilance will be required to ensure copyright integrity as long as new
digital technologies arise.'51
D. Continuing Legal Troubles
1. The MP3 Cases
a. RLAA v. MP3.com
The RIAA's litigation efforts against MP3 technology did not stop
with the Diamond Multimedia lawsuit or the SMDI. On January 21, 2000,
the RIAA filed suit against the website MP3.com, 52 asserting that the
website's new service, My.MP3, constituted copyright infringement.
5
3
including plaintiffs, insisted upon the development of an access control
and copy prevention system to inhibit the unauthorized reproduction
and distribution of motion pictures before they released films in the DVD
format.
Universal City Studios, 82 F. Supp.2d at 214. This case showed that the industry's
fears were warranted and the protection inadequate.
149. See Chris Oakes, DVD Round 1 Goes to Hackers, WIRED NEWS (Dec. 29, 1999)
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,33340,00.html> (on file with
author).
150. See Universal City Studios, 82 F. Supp.2d at 213.
151. See Kevin Davis, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34
U.S.F. L. REv. 129, 161 (1999). The author comments:
Technologically, the development of devices that block unauthorized
reproductions are a first step toward stopping the seemingly unstoppable
practice of bootlegging. The problem faced by the industry, however, is
that for every obstacle it puts in front of infringers, a counter technology
is soon developed to bypass the hurdle.
Id.
152. MP3.com is a website devoted to using MP3 technology to provide
recorded music to users over the Internet. MP3.com enters into direct
arrangements with musicians and also works with labels. See MP3.com, Inc. v.
Rosen, No. GIC 742982, at 1 10 (Super. Ct. San Diego Co. filed Feb. 7, 2000)
(complaint) <http://www.mp3.com/news/extra/mp3com-riaa_020800.html> (on
file with author).
153. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, No. 00 Civ. 0472 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.
filed Jan. 21, 2000) (complaint) <http://www.mp3.com/news/extra/-
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My.MP3 is a service where the consumer places a CD that he or she
ostensibly owns into a CD-ROM drive on a computer. Using its "Beam-it"
technology, MP3.com confirms the existence of the CD and gives the user
permanent web access to the tracks on that disc. 154 The problems with this
scheme, RIAA asserts, are twofold: first, MP3.com has no way of verifying
the ownership or legitimacy of the disc inserted by the consumer, 55 and,
second, MP3.com has no right to provide reproductions of CDs
copyrighted by RIAA's member musicians.
5 6
Unlike the Diamond Multimedia suit, this case was decided in favor
of the RIAA and the associated record companies.'57 Here, MP3.com's
technological argument failed to dazzle the court. MP3.com argued that
its recordings were not exact reproductions of plaintiffs' work, as they are
technically of lesser quality. 8  However, as the court noted, and as
MP3.com conceded, the human ear is generally unable to detect the
distinction between MP3 and CD files, rendering the difference
meaningless. 59 Additionally, since MP3.com's admitted goal was to create
an MP3 file that sounded as close to the original as possible, the argument
fell flat.'6
The court undertook a fair use analysis, which MP3.com failed.1
6 '
The first factor-the commercial nature of the work-failed because
MP3.com clearly stated that its goal was to facilitate higher traffic to the
site, thus attracting greater advertising dollars. 62 Additionally, the court
noted that the mere retransmission of files did not rise to the level of
"transformation" required by the first factor of the fair use test.13 Next, a
fair use test demands an examination of the nature of the copyrighted
riaa.mp3com-lawsuit.html> (on file with author). Though the RIAA lay behind
the suit, the complaint lists the following plaintiffs: UMG Recordings, Inc.; Sony
Music Entertainment, Inc.; Warner Brothers Records, Inc.; Arista Records, Inc.;
Atlantic Recording Corporation; BMG Music d/b/a The RCA Records Label;
Capitol Records, Inc.; Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.; Interscope Records; Sire
Records Group, Inc. See id.
154. See id. at 4.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 6, 28. MP3.comn does not reproduce a single copy of the
consumer's CD [which technically would be fair use, as the consumer has the right
to listen to his or her music from any location] but rather, contends RIAA, has
made infringing reproductions of 45,000 CDs. See id. at 1.
157. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F.Supp.2d 349, 350 (2000).
158. See id. at 350, n.1.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 350-52.
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work.'64 The near-perfect MP3 copies are not descriptive in any way-they
merely seek to replicate, as closely as possible, the original CD track. As
such, the court stated, MP3.com's claim fails the second factor.165 The
third factor, which addresses the amount of the copyrighted work that is
used, was especially problematic, as MP3.com expressly copies and
transmits the entire copyrighted CD in each instance.'6 The fourth factor,
which goes towards market effect, failed on its face, as MP3.com's actions
infringe upon the statutory right of a copyright holder to market his or
her sound recording.
67
The court's careful dismantling of MP3.com's fair use claim does not
bode well for new technology. It makes clear that the idea of "shifting"
music into cyberspace can only be done by the end-user directly-
MP3.com cannot act as a proxy. It ensures that mass MP3 reproduction of
CDs will not be considered a legitimate activity, even without proof of
piracy.
b. MP3.com v. RIAA
Not to be outdone, MP3.com had filed a wholly separate lawsuit
against the RIAA alleging defamation, trade libel, interference with
prospective economic advantage and unfair business practices.",s
MP3.com asserted that the RIAA continually makes statements
characterizing the website's services as "akin to stealing a CD from a
record store" 69 and that MP3.com steals and exploits music and
musicians. 17 Though the lawsuit does not so specify, one assumes that
these RLAA statements are made regarding the recent My.MP3 service.
MP3.com also states that the RIAA had approached investment bankers,
securities analysts, and MP3.com's financial partners and disparaged the
website and its services.'' It is unclear where this new litigation may lead,
but it certainly shows that the uneasy truce of SDMI was short-lived.
164. See id. at 351.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 352.
167. See id.
168. See MP3.com, Inc. v. Rosen, No. GIC 742982, at 1 10 (Super. Ct. San
Diego Co. filed Feb. 7, 2000) (complaint) <http://www.mp3.com/news/extra/-
mp3com-riaa_020800.html> (on file with author).
169. Seeid. at 15.
170. See id. at T 16.
171. Seeid. at 1J 17, 18.
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c. The Uneasy Recording Industry-MP3. com Truce
After expensive lawsuits and extensive mudslinging, at least two of
the record company plaintiffs have come to some sort of agreement with
MP3.com. Warner Music Group and BMG Entertainment have come to
an agreement where MP3.com will pay record labels for the right to
legally offer users the much-beleaguered "Beam-It" technology.1 7 This
deal provides MP3.com with access to big name, big label artists such as
Santana, R.E.M., and Whitney Houston.
1 7 3
However, this deal is not without a high price tag. Though actual
numbers have not been put forth, most estimates assert that this will cost
MP3.com around $100 million. 7 4  Although, like many new Net
companies, MP3.com is relatively cash-rich right now,75 analysts are
skeptical about how this will ultimately benefit MP3.com in particular and
the digital music industry in general.
This type of deal-making seems to point to increased record industry
control over content and licensing. Perhaps soon people will begin to
bemoan the loss of the free-wheeling, entrepreneurial spirit of the web.
Certainly these developments are good for traditional copyright, but do
they help us take full advantage of new technological possibilities?
Moreover, if all resolution requires costly lawsuits and even costlier
settlements, how will newcomers break into the market?
d. Lester Chambers v. MP3.com
As if the loss in the RIAA cases, combined with hefty settlement costs,
weren't enough, MP3.com faces additional lawsuits. In the Chambers 77
lawsuit, a group of recording artists'78 have asserted that the record
companies at issue in the original RIAA v. MP3.com suit failed to
172. See MP3.com Strikes Agreement with Warner Bros., BMG, <http://www.dailyne-
ws.yahoo.com/h/rolls/20000.. .esagreement with warner bros._bmgl.htm>.
173. See id.
174. See Derek Caney, Major Record Labels Seen Successful in MP3.com Deal,
<www.dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/2000061 1 /en/music-mp3.com_3.htm>.
175. See id.
176. See P.J. Huffstutter, MP3.com Settles Copyright Suit With Two Labels,
<http://www.calendarlive.com/music/20000609/t000054954.html> ("[MP3.com]
is paying a ton of money for something that, at least right now they're not getting
any direct revenue. It smacks of arm-twisting .... What this says is if MP3.com
plays nice, they'll have this content and maybe they'll be around next year.")
(quoting Malcolm Maclachlan, a senior industry analyst).
177. Lester Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 00 Civ. 2839 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr.
12, 2000).
178. A varied group, representing artists who have recorded for Time Warner,
BMG, RCA, Sony and Columbia. See id. at 11-14.
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distinguish between sound recordings undertaken by the plaintiffs prior
to revision of the copyright laws in 1972 and 1978.17' They have asserted
that they, and not the record companies, are the true owners of the• 180
copyrights in these sound recordings. As such, they have chosen to sue
both the record companies and MP3.com for copyright infringement.
This lawsuit raises interesting questions about the nature of who
owns music. The RIAA has acted under color of the notion that it stands
for the best interests of its member musicians, but this lawsuit seems to
undermine that assertion. Additionally, as a class action lawsuit,18 a
plaintiff victory could shift economic power greatly, and possibly make way
for those popular artists who have asserted their right to record and post
MP3 tracks. 82
e. MPL Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com'88
As music publishers, MPL and Peer license recording and
distribution rights for musical works. 84 With copyright charges largely
similar to those at stake in the RIAA case,8 the case now seems destined
to be a victory for plaintiffs. However, the court may use this as an
opportunity to determine the rights of music publishers in relation to
record companies, musicians, and online content providers.
2. The Napster Trilogy: The RIAA, Metallica and Dr. Dre
At the forefront of the latest MP3 controversy is a small startup
company called Napster.116 Napster provides users with software called
Music Share, which allows a user to share MP3 music directly with other
computers equipped with the same software.187 Napster does not act as a
server, and therefore does not technically "host" the potentially infringing
179. See id. at 726.
180. See id. at 127.
181. See id. at 1138-43.
182. Most notably, rap star Chuck D. and his group, Public Enemy, have
stepped to the forefront of supporting Internet music. See <http://www-
.rapstation.com/promo/lars vschuckd.html>.
183. MPL Communications, Inc. and Peer Int'l v. MP3.com, 00 Civ. 1979
(S.D.N.Y, filed Mar. 14, 2000).
184. See id. at 4-5.
185. See id. at 77 22 and 26.
186. See< http://www.napster.com>.
187. See Record Industry Scores Significant Wins in Battles Against Unauthorized MP3
Files; In Separate Cases, Court Rule that MP3. com Infringed Record Companies' Copyrights,
and that Napster is not Protected by Safe Harbor Provisions of Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 21 No. 12 ENT. L. REP 4, 4 (2000).
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files. '8 The RIAA sued Napster in December 1999, alleging contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement.9 Initially, Napster filed for partial
summary judgment, claiming that it should be protected under the "safe
harbor" provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act because it does
not actually house infringing files. 90 This claim was not upheld by the
court.' 91 The case now awaits a full trial, where it is expected that Napster
will allege that it has substantial noninfringing uses and align itself with
the Sony Betamax192 cases.9
Napster has also been sued by the prominent music group,
Metallica.'9 ' Metallica asserts that Napster's software allows for
contributory and vicarious software infringement, but goes on to raise a
RICO charge alleging that Napster's activities are an enterprise that
displays a pattern of racketeering activity.195  The group so far has
succeeded in forcing Napster to block 300,000 users who allegedly
infringed songs by the band.
96
Rap artist Dr. Dre also filed suit against Napster, stating that Napster
aids and abets the piracy of his songs over the Internet. 97 Dre had initially
requested, in writing, that Napster remove his songs but Napster did not
comply.
198
As these lawsuits rage on, many musicians have come out in favor of
Napster. Southern California punk band the Offspring has formed a
188. See id.
189. See A & M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP (N.D. Cal.,
May 8, 2000).
190. See No DMCA Safe Harbor for Napster, California Judge Rules, 3 No. 10
ANDREWS TELECOMM. INDUS. LrrIG. REP. 7, 7 (2000); see also supra note 178, at 4
(noting that the safe harbor provision applies only to those providers who transmit
or route information through their network. All routing in Napster takes place via
the Internet, rendering it ineligible for protection).
191. See Record Industry Scores Significant Wins in Battles Against Unauthorized Mp3
Files, supra note 187, at 4.
192. Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
193. See< http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,36191,00.htm>.
194. See Metallica et al. v. Napster Inc., No. 00-0391 (complaint) (C.D. Cal.
filed Apr. 13, 2000).
195. See Rock Group Hits Napster, Universities with Copyright and RICO Lawsuit, 6
No. 19 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LrrIG. REP. 5, 5 (2000).
196. See Record Industry Scores Significant Wins in Battles Against Unauthorized Mp3
Files, supra note 187, at 4. However, eager Napster users figured out a way to hack
around the block within days. See id.
197. See Young v. Napster Inc., No. 00-04366 (complaint) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr.
25, 2000).
198. See Rap Artist Spins Suit Against Internet Music Pirate, 12 No. 1. ANDREWS
SPORTS & EN-'. LITIG. REP. 5, 5 (2000). This piracy, however, has failed to hurt Dre,
whose latest record sold four million copies. See id.
1168 [Vol. 26:4
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partnership with Napster to sell Napster merchandise.'" Meanwhile,
rapper Chuck D., who founded an Internet MP3 site of his own,20
provided Napster with $5,000 in prize money for a contest that asked up-
and-coming artists to write a song to the tune of Public Enemy's seminal
rap song "Power to the People and the Beats."2 0 ' The contest asks artists to
write about why they support Napster.02
At heart of these debates-musician against musician, industry
against technology, label owner against artist-is the underlying
uncertainty of who, in this digital day and age, owns the music. Decisions
in the above cases will shape how music copyright is viewed in the digital
future, and should be watched carefully.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet and digital music transmission technology have
provided end-user consumers with unprecedented access to both legal
and pirated material. The courts have struggled to fit radical new
capabilities into an outmoded copyright framework. The electronics and
recording industries have been forced to look to private solutions, as
legislative maneuvering is not timely. The RIAA cases showcase these
legislative shortcomings. Private industry solutions serve as mere
stopgaps, as recent DVD technology hacking shows. Though the pace of
congressional change often is slow, new copyright laws are needed to
handle the revolutionary developments of Internet technology.
199. See< http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,36786,00.htm>.
200. See< http://www.rapstation.com>.
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